In World War I, Germany counted on the spiritual power of the Ottoman Sultan to activate “Muslim fanaticism” to the detriment of the Entente countries. A religious war of the colonies against the metropolises could force England and France to divert forces from the Western Front. German Kaiser Wilhelm II believed that the Ottomans thus held the key to the final victory in the war. However, Germany’s plans, like the fears of Great Britain and France, turned out to be far-fetched and reflected only the incorrect ideas of European politicians about Islam.
“Revolution in the Muslim Territories of Our Enemies” was the title of a document presented to the Kaiser in 1914 by the German aristocrat and orientalist Max von Oppenheim. The most important propaganda focus was on working with Muslim prisoners of war. According to the German strategist's plan, they were to be separated from other prisoners and gathered in one camp, provided with halal food and a mosque, and treated with respect. The idea formed the basis for the “Half Moon Camp” in Wünsdorf -Zossen, where Muslims were called upon to commit jihad by joining the Ottoman army.
Germany knew that the Ottomans were militarily exhausted, but it entered into a secret defensive alliance with the empire in 1914. In November, Sultan Mehmed V, posing as the leader of the Islamic world, backed up his declaration of war on the Entente with a call for a religious war against the enemies of Islam. The jihad was justified on the false ground that the Ottoman Empire and the Ummah were under attack from Russia, France, and Britain. The call was the result of German pressure to use Muslim potential to the detriment of its European rivals.
The proclamation of jihad in the form of five fatwas was prepared over the course of two weeks by three dozen Ottoman scholars. The first three fatwas made it clear that the caliph’s call applied to all Muslims in the world. The second extended the obligation of jihad to the Muslims of the Entente. Those who did not respond to the call would be subject to divine punishment, the third fatwa stated. The last two forbade Muslims living under the rule of Russia, France, and England to take up arms against the Ottoman Empire and fight against its allies – Germany and Austria.
The declaration of jihad in Istanbul provoked a strong reaction in the Islamic world as well as in Europe. The authorities of the French colonies and of British-occupied Egypt rejected the legitimacy of the action. Local leaders were forced to support the metropolis. In Algeria, the muftis directly referred to the declarations of their coreligionists in India and Russia, noting their loyalty to their countries and further asserting that the colonial Muslims “are well aware of the first duty of the Caliph – to protect and guide the Muslims in their affairs in accordance with the Quran. If he abandons this, he is no longer worthy of the Caliphate…”.
The Ottoman fatwa, ideologically born in Germany – the result of a conspiracy between the political forces of the Ottomans and the Triple Alliance states – was certainly questionable. France itself was very quick to join this game: the propaganda strategy was in many ways similar to the German one, with a focus on publishing brochures and magazines in Arabic (for example, Islamic France). The French used propaganda language based on the basic concepts and formulas of Islam, with which most Muslims could identify.
In addition, the French recruitment of foreigners included references to the country’s traditional “liberty, equality, and fraternity.” The appeal to ideals served to attract Europeans from different ethnic groups. In this context, new propaganda methods were invented, focusing on Arab-Ottoman contradictions, which would make the First World War look “sacred” and the Muslim Turks look “infidels.” The duel between German and French propaganda became completely confused from an ideological point of view. German strategists, like the French authorities, exaggerated the readiness of Muslims to rebel against their oppressors.
There is a tradition among Europeans of treating Islam as a “fanatical” and aggressive religion. Thus, the threat of jihad, invented in Berlin, frightened mainly only the authorities of France and Great Britain. During the First World War, most Muslims in the Ottoman Empire and beyond understood that this was not their war; they considered it completely unnecessary and did everything possible to maintain neutrality. In the circumstances, Muslims showed themselves to be cold-blooded pragmatists, which was the reason for the failure of the German propaganda campaign.
The topic presented is covered in more detail in the study by Russian historian Natalia Zherlitsina, “The Propaganda Struggle of Germany and France in Relation to North African Countries During the First World War”.
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